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Abstract
Objectives: To evaluate resident experience and perceptions
of medical error associated with emergency department
(ED) care. Methods: Using a semistructured interview
protocol, three researchers interviewed 26 randomly se-
lected medical, surgical, and obstetrics residents regarding
medical error. The authors chose a 16-case subset of
incidents involving ED care for initial review. Interview
transcripts were reviewed iteratively to draw out recurrent
categories and themes. Two investigators separately ana-
lyzed all cases to ensure common understanding and
agreement. Results: Most cases involved misdiagnosis,
misread radiographs, or inappropriate disposition. Two
thirds of the case patients died or experienced delays in
care. Residents felt that the complexity of the patients, as
well as the complexity of their own jobs, contributed to
error. Attending supervision, nurse evaluation, and addi-
tional physician involvement all were noted to be important
checks within the hospital system. Residents most often
held the ED responsible for error. In addition, they deemed
themselves, their teams, and their lack of training re-
sponsible. Though residents often discussed events with
their admitting teams, follow-up with the ED or other
associated individuals was uncommon. The findings re-
vealed seven common themes that include factors contrib-
uting to errors, checks and adaptations, and follow-up of the
event. Conclusions: Residents are aware of medical error
and able to recall events in detail. Whereas events are
discussed among inpatient teams, little information finds its
way back to the ED, potentially resulting in misunderstand-
ings between departments and hindering learning from
events. In-depth interviewing allows a nuanced and de-
tailed approach to error analysis. Key words: residents;
medical error; emergency medicine. ACADEMIC EMER-
GENCY MEDICINE 2003; 10:1318–1324.
From the prominent Institute of Medicine (IOM)
announcement that medical injury kills 44,000 to
98,000 patients annually, medical error and patient
safety have become large and public concerns for
every hospital and every medical specialty.1,2 In the
process of grappling with the challenges the IOM
report presents, it has become clear that emergency
medicine occupies a unique space in the nature and
response to medical error and patient safety.3,4
Given the complexity of the emergency department
(ED) environment, a driving question for researchers
who study patient safety has been how to develop
a fuller sense of the threats to patient safety, and how
to develop appropriate and operable responses. Re-
cent error-finding efforts have included dedicated,
persistent interviewing of all staff after every shift,
recording information on standardized data sheets,
and the review of charts selected through anonymous
reporting.5,6 Whereas broader hospital attempts to
quantify error have focused on chart review, other
methods have been attempted, including incident
report review, caretaker observation, e-mail solicita-
tion for error reporting, and automated computer
screening.4,7
Relatively few analyses of patient safety have
focused on the roles of residents and other trainees.
There is some suggestion, though, that housestaff
provide a rich source of information. O’Neil and
colleagues found that housestaff reporting via e-mail
identified an equal number of events as a record
review, but generally identified more preventable
events at lower cost.8 Wu et al. found a wide variety
of errors reported when they surveyed internal medi-
cine house officers regarding their responses to
medical mistakes.9
We specifically sought to understand residents’
experiences and perceptions of medical mishaps. This
effort entailed in-depth interviews with residents in
multiple specialties at various points of training. In-
depth interviews regarding medical error have been
performed with family practitioners and internists,
but not, to our knowledge, with house staff.10,11 In this
study, we analyzed a subset of the interviews,
specifically all cases in which residents discussed
a lapse in patient safety associated with ED care.
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Study Design. This study evaluated resident per-
ceptions of errors using case interviews. The study
protocol received approval from the University of
Michigan Institutional Review Board as well as the
appropriate hospital boards at the study site.
Study Setting and Population. Twenty-six residents
were chosen at random from all categorical residency
programs available at a 600-bed community teaching
hospital.
Study Protocol. Three researchers interviewed 26
randomly selected medical, surgical, and obstetrical
residents using a semistandardized interview pro-
tocol designed to draw out detailed descriptions of
three medical mishaps and one ‘‘near miss.’’12 While
there are emergency medicine residents at the hos-
pital, they are part of a joint program and were not
included in the interview sample. All residents were
volunteers and all participated with the understand-
ing that conversations, while recorded and tran-
scribed, would be stripped of names and other
identifying information as much as possible. No
attempt was made to guide the conversation to any
one aspect or area of training, and interviewees were
generally free to respond to requests for further
explanation with as much or as little detail as desired.
Interviewers probed for what the residents saw as the
nature of the errors described, the causes of errors,
the principal individuals involved, the results for
the patients, and the responses on the part of the
resident.
Interviewers deliberately chose and emphasized the
term ‘‘mishaps’’ during conversation to cast the widest
possible net and avoid the weight of the term ‘‘error.’’
In this discussion, however, the terms ‘‘mishap’’ and
‘‘error’’ have been used interchangeably. Whereas
interviewees were asked to categorize the cases that
they presented, no attempt was made to request cases
within categories, and the choice of case presentation
was left entirely to the interviewees. Interviewees were
free to stop the tape recorder or end the interview at
any time; none took advantage of this.
A total of 70 case interviews were obtained. A
subset of 16 cases involving ED care was selected for
this initial evaluation. All residents were closely
involved with the events they described, although
not always while in the ED. Some saw the patients
primarily in the ED, whereas others received the
patients after admission from the ED. This subset of
cases was reviewed iteratively with the goal of
drawing out categories and themes of discussion.
Each case was reviewed by at least two separate
investigators to ensure appropriate categorization and
common understanding of themes. We met to discuss
the overall analysis and ensure agreement.13–15
RESULTS
Sixteen cases were reviewed with the development of
seven distinct categories or themes of discussion
(Table 1). While some of these discussions were
prompted, such as factors that might be associated
with the event, others, most notably the checks and
adaptations within the medical system, rose from the
conversations.
Nature of the Mishaps. All of the cases reviewed
involved the ED. The majority of cases that residents
described involved some form of misdiagnosis (Table
2). More than one case appeared in which radiographs
were either lost or read incorrectly. In three cases,
residents recalled necessary antibiotics not being
provided in the ED; in one case, the antibiotic was
placed on the patient’s bed but not administered. An
equal number of cases involved inappropriate ED
disposition. Only one complication of an ED pro-
cedure was noted—a pneumothorax from a central
line. One resident questioned what he thought to be
inappropriate treatment in the ED, the provision of
normal saline to a hypernatremic patient.
Patient Outcomes. Patient outcomes were often
severe (Table 3). Five patients died during their
hospital stay. One patient was transferred to the ICU
from the floor within an hour of arrival; another was
discharged from the ED twice before ultimately being
admitted and dying from complications of hemor-
rhoid banding. In only one case where the interviewee
spoke specifically about a ‘‘near miss’’ was the
patient’s outcome both good and unaffected by the
mishap.
In most cases, residents suspected that mishaps
complicated hospital courses or delayed necessary
care, although they were not always convinced of this.
Residents expressed uncertainty as to whether the
timing of the treatment or diagnosis truly influenced
outcomes (Table 4). Comments regarding patient out-
comes reflected a sense of the limitations of medical
interventions.
Resident Interpretation of the Locus of Responsi-
bility. These 16 cases were chosen based on the
involvement of the ED. It is partially by design, then,
that the residents most often interpreted the ED team
TABLE 1. Major Themes in Residents’ Discussions
of Medical Mishaps
Nature of the mishap
Patient outcome
Resident interpretation of locus of responsibility
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as primarily responsible for the mishaps described.
The ED was not alone, however, in being assigned
responsibility for events. Residents also discussed the
responsibilities of the admitting or consulting teams,
the responsibilities of individual residents and con-
sultants, and even the responsibility of the patient in
preventing mishaps (Table 5; available as a data
supplement at aemj.org).
Contributory Factors. For the majority of cases,
residents generated one or more factors associated
with the mishap that they felt partially explained the
event or its resolution. These factors fell into three
broad categories—the complexity of hospitalized
patients, the organization of work within the hospital,
and lack of appropriate training (Table 6; data
supplement, aemj.org). The organization of work
included inability to locate x-rays, trouble communi-
cating with patients, the large burden of patient re-
sponsibilities, and even illness among care providers.
Checks and Adaptations. Residents noted a number
of checks in hospital systems and personal adapta-
tions that generally worked to prevent mishaps (Table
7; data supplement, aemj.org). In the cases reviewed,
these checks were often the points at which a mishap
was uncovered. On their account, the patient may
have experienced only a delay in definitive care rather
than a more serious outcome. Attending and senior
resident physician supervision and independent
nurse evaluation of patients featured prominently in
detecting the problems. The addition of more physi-
cians allowed the gathering of further information
and the confirmation of decisions. Residents also
discussed their own efforts to confirm interpretations
or actions.
Residents implied their awareness of the potential
for mishap by their emphasis on repetition and
confirmation, both by people and through studies.
Several residents noted the important role that spe-
cialty consultation plays in avoiding error, as well as
the need to obtain additional labs or additional opin-
ions to keep complicated patients on track. There was
some suggestion that the mishaps taught residents
when they needed to call for help or confirmation.
Acknowledgment and Follow-up. Residents re-
ported limited documentation of mishaps (Table 8;
data supplement, aemj.org). Charting occasionally
was mentioned, sometimes with statements suggest-
ing that the event may not actually have been noted in
the chart. Two cases were taken to morbidity and
mortality conferences. Only one case generated an
incident report, and one case was sent to risk man-
agement. Informally, the majority of cases were dis-
cussed with the primary physician team, most often
with the attending in charge. Few cases were discus-
sed with the ED or other involved services. Even when
asked directly whether there was follow-up with the
ED, residents frequently stated that they were not
certain. Two cases were discussed with nurses, two at
rounds, and one explicitly with family members.
TABLE 2. Nature of the Mishaps
Misdiagnosis (8)
30-year-old M with end-stage renal disease, pneumonia diagnosed as fever of unknown origin
60-year-old F with ischemic limb diagnosed as cerebrovascular accident
90-year-old M admitted for urosepsis, found to have pneumonia
90-year-old F with atypical chest pain found to have acute MI
20-year-old M after motor vehicle collision, missed cardiac tamponade
65-year-old M admitted for pneumonia, found to have pulmonary embolus
60-year-old M admitted for CVA, found to have spinal cord compression
M admitted for acute MI found to have intracerebral hemorrhage
Misread radiograph (3)
30-year-old M with end-stage renal disease, missed pneumonia
Hypotensive F with free air missed on abdominal films
20-year-old M after motor vehicle collision, later noted to have visible pericardial blood on abdominal CT
Medication not given (3)
Antibiotics not started in ED
Inappropriate ED disposition (3)
Hypotensive male, admitted to floor, immediately transferred to ICU
41-year-old F with CHF, ejection fraction 20%, sent home for outpatient pneumonia treatment, subsequently admitted
40-year-old M with complication of hemorrhoid banding, twice sent home from ED without notification of surgeon
Procedural complication (1)
Pneumothorax after central line placement
Other (2)
Provision of normal saline to a hypernatremic patient
Delayed diagnosis of intra-abdominal hemorrhage in a 20-year-old F with ITP and syncope
Note: total is >16 because some cases fit multiple categories
TABLE 3. Patient Outcomes (per Residents’
Assessments)
Death 5
Delay in definitive care 6
Complicated course of hospitalization or illness 3
No effect 2
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Offered Solutions. Askeddirectly, residents offered a
limited number of solutions to the problems they noted
(Table 9; data supplement, aemj.org). These generally
fell into three categories: computer-based responses,
system redesigns, and improved communication.
DISCUSSION
Our interviews were designed to uncover residents’
perceptions; therefore, they may tell us more about
the residents themselves than the ED or the system of
medical care. Alternatively, they may offer hints
toward improved education, understanding, and ulti-
mately, patient care.
The majority of events that residents recalled were
cases of misdiagnosis. This is consistent with previous
studies.16 In this respect, physicians are distinct from
nurses, who tend to focus more on errors in care
delivery such as medication dosages, than in the
cognitive errors of care determination.17 A greater
concern for misdiagnosis might also be expected of
residents who, in the midst of their training, are
taught to focus on differential diagnosis.18
Generally, residents recalled cases in which patient
outcomes were poor, in which necessary care had
been delayed, or in which there was a substantial
change in medical course after recognition of the
mishap. Wu, in questionnaires from 114 house offi-
cers, noted a trend toward significant adverse out-
comes following medical errors.9 A bias toward
severity may simply be the result of what residents
recall; if so, it suggests a limitation in any retrospec-
tive survey of residents regarding patient safety.
Residents were, at times, careful to note that they
could not firmly establish the link between a mishap
and the patient’s ultimate outcome. Despite this
uncertainty, however, residents felt the mishaps were
important, noting that earlier intervention might have
alleviated some part of a bad outcome.
Many reported mishaps were associated with
radiology. These suggest the importance of the
relationship between the ED and radiology and the
emphasis that residents place on diagnostic imaging.
Radiologic misinterpretation carries a high malprac-
tice risk for emergency medicine, and several authors
have described interventions designed to improve
emergency readings, including the creation of a ‘‘false-
negative case file,’’ group review of all films with
a disparity between ED and radiology reads, and
improved and consistent communication between the
emergency and radiology departments.19–21
One of the surprising aspects of the residents’
interpretations of responsibility for the mishaps is the
varied view of the role of the ED. At one end of the
spectrum, interviewed residents expressed frustration
that not all questions had been answered while the
patient was still in the ED. At the same time, the
admitting teams and consulting residents noted that
there were cases in which the final diagnosis, and the
judgment of the seriousness of that diagnosis, should
not be viewed as entirely within the purview of
the ED. The ED goals of initial patient evaluation,
intervention, and disposition are not always un-
derstood by subsequent care providers. A clearer
understanding of the role of the ED may benefit
patient safety by narrowing the scope of investigation
and providing focus. This also suggests that ED
patient safety efforts may be more rewarding if
focused on more complete communication and ap-
propriate disposition rather than more extended
diagnostic effort. Furthermore, a shared understand-
ing of the complementary roles of the ED and the
admitting services may contribute to more effective
and efficient communication.
Residents were easily able to point out issues that
contributed to patient risk. Two aspects of their
concerns are closely related: the complexity of hos-
pitalized patients, and the need for more knowledge
and training to provide appropriate care. Caring for
more complex patients may require a broader knowl-
edge base, but this point of view also reflects a very
traditional view of patient safety, specifically that in-
dividual knowledge can prevent adverse outcomes.
This response is somewhat ironic: those interviewed,
after all, were trainees at a training institution. It is also
troubling, because the most logical response to a defi-
cit in training is more training. This is a valuable ap-
proach, certainly, but one with limitations. It may also
be a common response because this is an area over
which trainees feel that they and their instructors have
some control. However, the implied suggestion, that
with sufficient training there will be no mishaps, con-
tradicts established theories on human performance.
Residents also acknowledged the importance that
workplace systems play in patient safety. They noted
the likely contributions of long nights and heavy
patient loads.22 There is an almost overwhelming
diversity to the nature of their organizational con-
cerns, from the resident too sick to communicate
effectively, to inadequate translation services, to diffi-
culty locating an x-ray. The commonality among these
aspects of workplace organization may be that they
TABLE 4. Comments Reflecting Uncertainty in the Link between Mishaps and Outcomes
‘‘I don’t know if hewasgivenantibioticsearlierduring thenight, like12hoursearlier,maybe thatcouldhavesavedhis life,orcouldnot.’’
‘‘I think that now we have the benefit of having the autopsy results back and heparin, I don’t think heparin would have saved this
man’s life even if we had started it.’’
‘‘His life expectancy would probably be very short because it was metastatic lung cancer and it was. . .not a good diagnosis to
have. But potentially at least the paralysis. . .could have been prevented.’’
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are not usually easy to remedy. In the effort to reduce
error, however, these may be some of the most reward-
ing challenges, but each requires concerted, individual
attention.
A number of residents emphasized the importance
of supervision, most typically provided by the in-
patient senior resident or attending, as a safeguard
against mishap. The presumably error-prone environ-
ment of a teaching hospital has been one of the
arguments for 24-hour staff supervision in the ED.23
Holliman et al. demonstrated that attending super-
vision successfully averted limb- or life-threatening er-
rors in 17 of 1,000 patients, including cases of missed
fractures, inability to intubate, and inappropriate
outpatient disposition.24 There was little recognition
in our interviews that levels of supervision differ
throughout the hospital, and that in the ED attending
staff evaluated every patient during the initial visit,
whereas the initial evaluation by an admitting attend-
ing might wait until the next morning.
It is notable that despite formal and informal
adaptations to prevent them, mishaps still occurred.
Often, residents suggested that if a single person
had acted differently, the mishap might have been
prevented. Even for diagnostic studies and interven-
tions, interviewees frequently emphasized additional
human evaluation, both to confirm the results of stud-
ies and to be sure that specific events were carried
through in a timely fashion. Individual vigilance, by
multiple individuals, was felt to play an essential role
in the prevention of mishaps. This emphasizes the
importance that residents placed on both systems and
individual action in providing safe medical care, and
also demonstrates how often systems level responses
may still rely on individual action.
Whereas residents reported significant discussion
of mishaps within the circle of the primary in-patient
team, there was little discussion outside of this circle
and little involvement of formal quality assurance or
risk management systems. Residents indicated that
their primary responsibility was to notify their at-
tendings, and that further discussion would have
to originate from the attending. Residents did not
view informing the ED of the error as part of their
responsibility. Even in the cases where follow-up was
supposed to pass from the attending through the
administrative hierarchy to the ED, there was no
mentioned mechanism for confirmation to the resi-
dent that the concern was carried forward. Because
this feedback loop is never closed, there is little
reward for the resident in discussing the case and no
systematic reinforcement.
The limited and circuitous feedback leaves the ED
and other involved individuals or services with little
ability to improve their processes. It also leaves little
opportunity to explain decision making and develop
a better understanding of prior events, thought
processes in the ED, and changes in the patient’s
condition. By the time concerns pass through a formal
administrative superstructure, it will likely be too late
to benefit the individual patient. A more direct
mechanism might contribute to resident education,
individual patient care, and improved communica-
tion between the ED and the admitting services.
Few of these 16 cases would have been discovered
through chart review or an incident reporting
system.8,25 Standardized ED case review, evaluating
all cases of death within 48 hours of admission or
transfer to the intensive care unit within 48 hours of
admission, might have uncovered several. The con-
cern, however, for improvement of hospital mecha-
nisms and, specifically, improvement in ED care, is
clear. Without some form of feedback, no change can
take place, and little effort was made to get critical,
timely, and educated feedback to the ED.
In two cases, residents noted their discussions with
families, although neither mishap was entirely and
openly acknowledged. Greater openness with fami-
lies, rather than provoking malpractice litigation, may
protect against claims by reducing patient or family
anger at a perceived cover-up.26 Although disclosure
regarding error maintains trust in the doctor-patient
relationship and is clearly an ethical responsibility,
our interviews suggest that it is rare and difficult to
carry out, even in the most well-intentioned family
discussions.27,28 Without institutional support, the
guidance of their staff physicians, and training in
appropriate conversational approaches, residents are
unlikely to undertake these conversations.29,30
Residents only occasionally mentioned morbidity
and mortality rounds, a traditional training mecha-
nism for reviewing error in medical care.31 It is not
clear whether this is because they are not attended
by, or available for, residents, or are not valued as
a method of reviewing mishaps.
Despite acknowledging the need for better mecha-
nisms to assure patient safety, residents had few sug-
gestions for achieving this. Most commonly they
called for guidelines and suggested a need for closer
communications. Weingart has suggested that resi-
dents are poorly trained to take part in quality
improvement efforts and has offered suggestions to
make them more aware of organizational problem
solving and to enable them to take part in hospital-
wide efforts.32 Resident comments in our interviews
confirm this—residents are aware that there is a larger
system at work, but they are not always certain what
this means and how they might play a role in shaping
that system.
Implications for Resident Training and Error
Analysis. Whereas residents are certainly aware of
the mishaps that take place in the hospital, they
appear to be only minimally aware of the various
methods of error analysis and systems-based ap-
proaches to patient safety.33,34 There is a need for
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further training in approaches to patient safety that
reach beyond the individual resident or care team.
In a recent study, emergency medicine residency
directors indicated that all 112 of 112 programs
surveyed have methods in place to track and report
ED-associated errors, such as morbidity and mortality
conferences, quality assurance case reviews, continu-
ous quality improvement audits, and radiographic
and electrocardiogram overread conferences.35 Our
interviews suggest that another source of cases for
analysis are admitting services. Analysis of these
events, particularly if carried out jointly with the other
involved services, might provide a broader under-
standing of patient safety, lead to greater understand-
ing of the role of the ED, and smooth communication
between the various services.
As a test series, these cases suggest some of the
difficulties involved in a broad reporting system with
follow-up analysis, including extreme complexity,
wide variety, and limited straightforward points for
intervention. They also suggest the benefits of an
interview-based approach as the rich detail uncovers
the broad range of influences on patient safety and the
multiple causative factors that may play a role. In-
terviews provide a mechanism to approach errors in
diagnosis, one of the most intractable of medical er-
rors, but also one of the most frequently recalled by
house officers.
The lack of feedback offered to ED staff suggests
that the ED itself must actively seek out complications
and mishaps resulting from ED care. This may mean
soliciting feedback or using automated systems to
uncover possible problems. ED directors usually re-
view cases of in-patient transfers of service or death in
under 48 hours, but the admitting residents inter-
viewed appeared to be unaware of this. Even with
these reviews, however, the presence and details of
mishaps might not be clearly documented in the
medical record.
LIMITATIONS
This series of 16 events provides only an initial
picture. The biases of recall and hindsight influence
all of our interviews. We can make, at best, only lim-
ited and relative quantitative statements because our
analysis is qualitative in nature. We believe that our
findings are typical of what might be discovered at a
community teaching hospital, though they have char-
acteristics specific to the hospital in which the inter-
views were conducted. Even a single episode of error,
or a near miss, can result in understanding or systems
change with widespread benefits it is appropriately
analyzed.36–40
Because the original interview study design in-
cluded only internal medicine, surgical, and obstetri-
cal residents, all of our interviews were with residents
in training programs other than emergency medicine.
Most had spent at least one month during their intern-
ship working in the ED. There are probably differ-
ences in the view of medical error between these
residents and emergency medicine–trained attendings
or residents. The process of decision making in the
ED, and therefore the nature of errors in decision
making and the appropriate responses, differs from
that of other specialties.41 Interviews with admitting
residents provides only one side of the story. This is
an essential side, however, if we are to understand the
web of interactions and relationships that allows the
hospital to work.
Ideally, we would have been able to analyze these
cases from multiple points of view, including those of
consultants and attendings. Chart review or patient
interview might also aid understanding of circum-
stances. However, because all interviews were con-
ducted after the fact and under a guarantee of
anonymity, these confirmatory methods were not con-
sistently possible. Further review of these cases would
likely enhance understanding of these events; how-
ever, the loss of anonymity required might prevent
open discussion during the interviews. Finally, one
might question whether what the residents perceived
as error would be considered such in the eyes of a
more experienced observer. Because our goal was to
analyze resident perceptions, and because the exis-
tence of an ‘‘error’’ may not always be generally
agreed, we did not push for factual confirmation.
CONCLUSIONS
Residents are aware of mishaps occurring in the
hospital and are able to recall events in detail when
interviewed. Interviews offer a detailed and nuanced
means of analyzing mishaps in medical care. Resi-
dents recognize the uncertainty that is inherent in
decision making and post-hoc error analysis. They
also recognize their own limitations and emphasize
their individual roles in preventing mishaps along
with noting the importance of attending supervision.
The exact role of the ED in the care of the hospitalized
patient is not generally agreed upon. The ED rarely
receives direct feedback after a mishap occurs,
limiting the ability to learn from events, and perhaps
further compromising patient care as the new care
team does not seek a more complete story.
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